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The Centennial Shuffle: City of Enid v. Public Employees
Relations Board: How the Oklahoma Supreme Court
Upheld a Century of Population-Based Classifications
While Foreshadowing Another Century of Confusion
Concerning the Laws that Govern Them*
Laws and institutions, like clocks, must be occasionally cleansed,
and wound up, and set to true time.1
— Henry Ward Beecher
Abolitionist, Clergyman, and Orator
(1813-1887)
I. Introduction
On March 14, 2006, the Oklahoma Supreme Court chose to rehear2 the case
of City of Enid v. Public Employees Relations Board.3 By doing so, the court
revisited the issue of whether collective bargaining agreements, authorized by
title 11, section 51-201 of the Oklahoma Statutes,4 for eleven of Oklahoma’s
largest municipalities constituted a general law or a prohibited law within the
meaning of Oklahoma’s special law prohibitions.5 With the shift of Justice
Winchester’s vote,6 the Oklahoma Supreme Court issued a five-to-four, per
curiam opinion upholding the constitutionality of the Oklahoma Municipal
Employee Collective Bargaining Act7 as a permissible, general law under
* Kristopher Dale Jarvis serves as a Note Editor of the Oklahoma Law Review and was
recognized with the 2006-2007 Gene and Joann Sharp Best Case Note Award. First, the author
would like to thank his parents, Terry and Katie Jarvis, for the opportunities that their sacrifices
have provided him. Further, the author would like to acknowledge the contributions of
Professors Srividhya Ragavan, David Swank, and Rick Tepker to this piece and to the author’s
success in the field of law. The author also extends a special thanks to Governor George Nigh,
who inspired and cultivated the author’s love for Oklahoma through the example of his life and
his invaluable friendship. Finally, this note is dedicated to the memory of Captain Brian
Edward Wheeler (USA). Job well done Captain, be thou at peace.
1. HENRY WARD BEECHER, LIFE THOUGHTS 129 (Boston, Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1858).
2. See OKLA. SUP. CT. R. 1.13 (explaining the process of rehearing).
3. 2006 OK 16, 133 P.3d 281 (per curiam).
4. See 11 OKLA. STAT. § 51-201 (Supp. 2006).
5. City of Enid, ¶ 7, 133 P.3d at 285.
6. Compare City of Enid, ¶ 26, 133 P.3d at 290 (showing that Vice Chief Justice
Winchester concurred with Justices Lavender, Hargrave, Kauger, and Edmondson), with City
of Enid v. Pub. Employees Relations Bd., No. SD-101,729, 2005 Okla. LEXIS 57, at *27 (Okla.
July 5, 2005) (showing that Vice Chief Justice Winchester originally opposed those same
justices), withdrawn and substituted by 2006 OK 16, 133 P.3d 281 (per curiam).
7. 11 OKLA. STAT. §§ 51-200 to -220.
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article 5, sections 46 and 59 of the Oklahoma Constitution.8 Whereas the first
opinion demanded an unprecedented universality in municipal legislation, the
second opinion supplanted this notion with a return to legislative deference.
Fundamentally, the decision in the rehearing of City of Enid substantiated
the legislature’s capacity to enact legislation for Oklahoma municipalities
based on population. Furthermore, the case invalidated the previous
majority’s misconception that Oklahoma’s special law proscriptions require
“state legislation regulating the affairs of cities to embrace all cities in the
state.”9 In upholding this statute, the Oklahoma Supreme Court honored the
intent of the state’s constitutional framers, galvanized the constitutional
inquiry regarding special law prohibitions on the classification contained
within challenged legislation, and employed the appropriate test to find that
the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act represented a
general law. Nevertheless, by confusing the demarcation between challenges
under article 5, section 46 and article 5, section 59 and by issuing an opinion
limited in scope and quality, the City of Enid court failed to capitalize on a
seminal opportunity to recast Oklahoma special law jurisprudence and,
consequently, rendered a just result at the expense of clarity and future utility.
This note concentrates on the strengths and weaknesses of the City of Enid
decision in six parts. Part II recounts the evolution of special law prohibitions
and state case law addressing such prohibitions prior to City of Enid. Part III
outlines the facts of City of Enid and details the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s
findings and reasoning. Part IV proffers an analysis of the court’s findings
and rationale. Part V discusses the impact of this decision on Oklahoma
constitutional law and the separate branches of Oklahoma government. This
note concludes with Part VI.
II. Law Prior to City of Enid v. Public Employees Relations Board
A. The Evolution of Constitutional Prohibitions Against Special Laws
The doctrine of special law prohibitions is best illustrated from a historical
perspective. With the end of the Civil War, the advent of the modern
industrial age, and widespread perceptions of collusion between influential
corporations and state legislatures, tensions flared across the national political
landscape.10 The “concentration of money held by private, powerful
8. City of Enid, ¶ 26, 133 P.3d at 290.
9. Id. ¶ 6, 133 P.3d at 306 (Taylor, J., dissenting).
10. Donald Marritz, Making Equality Matter (Again): The Prohibition Against Special
Laws in the Pennsylvania Constitution, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 161, 185-86 (1993) (explaining
the origins of Pennsylvania’s constitutional prohibition against special laws and offering a
detailed account of the mores that helped shape its course).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss1/5

2007]

NOTE

193

corporations exerted a disproportionate, if not all-consuming, influence on the
legislature,” leading commentators of the period to characterize state
government as nothing more than an agent reacting to dominant financial
interests.11 Believing that the only avenue to halt legislative misbehavior “was
to lead the Legislature, if possible, out of temptation, by taking from it
everything it had to sell,”12 many states incorporated prohibitions against
special and local laws into their constitutions.13
The concept of special law prohibitions emerged from the same paradigm
of equality law that produced equal protection.14 Though special law
proscriptions primarily concerned legislative malfeasance, they also
“reflect[ed] a concern for equal treatment under the law.”15 Where equal
protection sought to “eradicate legal disabilities resulting from slavery,”
special law prohibitions sought to ameliorate inequities in the areas of
“economics and social welfare.”16 Special and local law proscriptions cast a
broad stroke to further these aims, as evidenced by the first federal statute
concerning special laws, which specifically enumerated twenty-four forbidden
areas of legislation in the territories.17 Many states, including Oklahoma, built
11. Id. at 186.
12. Id. at 190.
13. See Amasa M. Eaton, Recent State Constitutions, 6 HARV. L. REV. 109, 122 (1892)
(discussing the proliferation of state legislative authority into the subdivisions of the states, and
how this incursion led to a burgeoning response within new state constitutions against special
and local laws made by the state legislature).
14. See generally Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law,
63 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1985) (discussing the emergence of the equality doctrine, equal
protection, and prohibitions against special laws in a number of state constitutions).
15. Id. at 1209.
16. See Marritz, supra note 10, at 184-85.
17. See Act of July 30, 1886, ch. 818, § 1, 24 Stat. 170, 170 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1471
(1886)), repealed by Act of Dec. 8, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-213, § 16(w), 97 Stat. 1459, 1463.
The act provided in pertinent part
[t]hat the legislatures of the Territories of the United States now or hereafter to be
organized shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated
cases, that is to say:
XXxGranting divorces
XXxChanging the names of persons or places.
XXxLaying out, opening, altering and working roads or highways.
XXxVacating roads, town-plats, streets, alleys, and public grounds.
XXxLocating or changing county seats.
XXxRegulating county and township affairs.
XXxRegulating the practice in courts of justice.
XXxRegulating the jurisdiction and duties of justices of the peace, police
magistrates, and constables.
XXxProviding for changes of venue in civil and criminal cases.
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on this federal statute to create their respective bans on special and local
laws.18
XXxIncorporating cities, towns, or villages, or changing or amending the charter
of any town, city, or village.
XXxFor the punishment of crimes or misdemeanors.
XXxFor the assessment and collection of taxes for Territorial, county, township,
or road purposes.
XXxSummoning and impaneling grand or petit jurors.
XXxProviding for the management of common schools.
XXxRegulating the rate of interest on money.
XXxThe opening and conducting of any election or designating the place of
voting.
XXxThe sale or mortgage of real estate belonging to minors or others under
disability.
XXxThe protection of game or fish.
XXxChartering or licensing ferries or toll bridges.
XXxRemitting fines, penalties, or forfeitures.
XXxCreating, increasing, or decreasing fees, percentage, or allowances of public
officers during the term for which said officers are elected or appointed.
XXxChanging the law of descent.
XXxGranting to any corporation, association, or individual the right to lay down
railroad tracks, or amending existing charters for such purpose.
XXxGranting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or
exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise whatever.
XXxIn all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law
shall be enacted in any of the Territories of the United States by the Territorial
legislatures thereof.
Id.
18. See OKLA CONST. art. 5, § 46. The section provides that
[t]he Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass
any local or special law authorizing:
XXxThe creation, extension, or impairing of liens;
XXxRegulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards, or school districts;
XXxChanging the names of persons or places;
XXxAuthorizing the laying out, opening, altering, or maintaining of roads,
highways, streets, or alleys;
XXxRelating to ferries or bridges, or incorporating ferry or bridge companies,
except for the erection of bridges crossing streams which form boundaries between
this and any other state;
XXxVacating roads, town plats, streets, or alleys;
XXxRelating to cemeteries, graveyards, or public grounds not owned by the State;
XXxAuthorizing the adoption or legitimation of children;
XXxLocating or changing county seats;
XXxIncorporating cities, towns, or villages, or changing their charters;
XXxFor the opening and conducting of elections, or fixing or changing the places
of voting;
XXxGranting divorces;
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B. Oklahoma Special and Local Law Prohibitions
The framers of the Oklahoma Constitution drew from a complex mixture
of federal, state, and territorial sources to inform their construction of special
and local law prohibitions. The federal statute of 1886 banning special laws
in U.S. territories provided the textual blueprint for Oklahoma’s special and
local law prohibitions,19 while original understanding was shaped locally by
state and territorial judiciaries crafting the borders between general and
special laws.20 Contemporary state courts defined general laws as legislation
XXxCreating offices, or prescribing the powers and duties of officers, in counties,
cities, towns, election or school districts;
XXxChanging the law of descent or succession;
XXxRegulating the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence
in judicial proceedings or inquiry before the courts, justices of the peace, sheriffs,
commissioners, arbitrators, or other tribunals, or providing or changing the
methods for the collection of debts, or the enforcement of judgments or
prescribing the effect of judicial sales of real estate;
XXxRegulating the fees, or extending the powers and duties of aldermen, justices
of the peace, or constables;
XXxRegulating the management of public schools, the building or repairing of
school houses, and the raising of money for such purposes;
XXxFixing the rate of interest;
XXxAffecting the estates of minors, or persons under disability;
XXxRemitting fines, penalties and forfeitures, and refunding moneys legally paid
into the treasury;
XXxExempting property from taxation;
XXxDeclaring any named person of age;
XXxExtending the time for the assessment or collection of taxes, or otherwise
relieving any assessor or collector of taxes from due performance of his official
duties, or his securities from liability;
XXxGiving effect to informal or invalid wills or deeds;
XXxSummoning or impaneling grand or petit juries;
XXxFor limitation of civil or criminal actions;
XXxFor incorporating railroads or other works of internal improvements;
XXxProviding for change of venue in civil and criminal cases.
Id.
19. Compare id., with § 1, 24 Stat. at 170.
20. See Chi. Terminal Transfer R.R. v. Greer, 79 N.E. 46, 47-48 (Ill. 1906) (holding that
an act providing for the establishment of city courts in municipalities with at least three
thousand inhabitants was not unconstitutional class legislation); State ex rel. Hargrave v. Reitz,
62 Ind. 159 (1878) (sustaining an act providing salary increases for judges in counties with a
population greater than forty thousand); Hanlon v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 53 Ind. 123 (1876)
(upholding an act that increased salaries for the county auditor in counties where the population
exceeded fifteen thousand); Ladd v. Holmes, 66 P. 714, 717-18 (Or. 1901) (sustaining a statute
that enacted specific provisions for electing delegates to political conventions only in cities of
the state containing a population of ten thousand or more); Peterson v. State, 56 S.W. 834, 834-
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premised upon rational classifications rather than universal inclusion.21 One
court held that to require general laws to operate upon all things or all persons
of the state would leave the state with few general laws, if any of that class.22
Another court ruled that a classification for purposes of general legislation
could properly be challenged upon a showing that its premise was “purely
arbitrary, unreasonable, unjust, or capricious.”23 Drawing on this backdrop,
Oklahoma’s territorial judiciary also contrasted general laws from special
laws, which the territorial judiciary understood as enactments that related to
and distinguished “one section from others of a general class.”24 The
territorial court defined a local law as a particular category of special law
encompassing “such legislation as relates to only a portion of the territory or
state, or a part of its people, or to a fraction of the property of its citizens.”25
The confluence of these national, state, and territorial influences produced
article 5, sections 32, 46, and 59 of the Oklahoma Constitution, which
safeguard the citizens of Oklahoma against impermissible special and local
legislation.26
Article 5, section 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides the cornerstone
of the state’s prohibitions against special and local laws.27 This section
demonstrates a close succession from federal special law statutes and
disallows the passage of twenty-eight distinct classes of special and local
laws, including a ban against state encroachment into city and county affairs.28
The significance of the similarities between section 46 and prior federal
special law prohibitions increased when tempered by the territorial court’s
assessment that the federal statute controlling the territory operated as “an
absolute prohibition on the legislature’s enacting any special law in reference
to the subjects enumerated.”29 Consequently, in the subject areas specifically

35 (Tenn. 1900) (upholding an act to prevent stock running in counties having a population of
fifty-nine thousand or more according to a federal census).
21. See State ex rel. Van Riper v. Parsons, 40 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. 1878) (holding that the term
“general law” does not necessitate universality in the subject or operation of the law).
22. Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366, 375 (1869) (upholding a state ordinance allowing for
separate treatment of different types of title).
23. State v. Hogan, 58 N.E. 572, 573 (Ohio 1900) (upholding a state “tramp law” which
criminalized assault by a vagrant upon a citizen as not being class-based or special legislation).
24. Territory ex rel. Taylor v. Sch. Dist. No. 83, 1901 OK 22, ¶ 9, 64 P. 241, 241.
25. Id.
26. OKLA. CONST. art. 5, §§ 32, 46, 59.
27. It should be noted that Oklahoma’s framers not only incorporated the entire corpus of
the existing federal statute, but also added additional provisions. See supra notes 17-19 and
accompanying text.
28. See OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 46.
29. Guthrie Daily Leader v. Cameron, 1895 OK 71, ¶ 30, 41 P. 635, 638.
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enumerated in article 5, section 46, the command against the passage of
special and local laws continues to be understood as “unequivocal and
unqualified.”30
Two corollary sections complete the treatment of special and local laws in
the Oklahoma Constitution.31 Article 5, section 59 of the Oklahoma
Constitution expands the ban on special laws beyond the enumerated fields of
article 5, section 46 and declares that all other “[l]aws of a general nature shall
have a uniform operation throughout the State, and where a general law can
be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.”32 Consequently, even
legislation not expressly forbidden by Oklahoma’s special law prohibitions
will be invalidated if a similar general law could be fashioned. Nevertheless,
recognizing that “the law must, in dealing with persons and property and
governmental divisions, group persons or objects having similar attributes into
classes,”33 the Oklahoma Constitution allows for the enactment of special laws
when a general law cannot be crafted.34 Pursuant to article 5, section 32, a
special law may be considered by the legislature once a four-week publication
period has elapsed and verification has been presented to the Oklahoma
Secretary of State.35 This procedural exception for special laws operates
outside the purview of the specific prohibitions otherwise articulated in the
constitution and in no way contravenes the forbidden categories of article 5,
section 46.36 Accordingly, while the constitution permits the legislature to
pass special laws when the subject and purpose of the legislation cannot be
dealt with by general law,37 the unqualified barriers of article 5, section 46
remain inviolable.38
C. Oklahoma Case Law Prior to City of Enid
Oklahoma courts have toiled with the application of the constitutional
prohibition against special laws and local laws.39 Although recent decisions
30. City of Enid v. Pub. Employees Relations Bd., 2006 OK 16, ¶ 2, 133 P.3d 281, 303
(Opala, J., dissenting).
31. See OKLA. CONST. art. 5, §§ 32, 59.
32. Id. § 59.
33. State v. Hogan, 58 N.E. 572, 573 (Ohio 1900).
34. See OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 59.
35. Id. § 32.
36. See Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, ¶¶ 16-17, 760 P.2d 816, 822-23.
37. Id. ¶ 16, 760 P.2d at 822.
38. Id. ¶ 17, 760 P.2d at 822-23.
39. See generally Hamilton v. Oklahoma City, 1974 OK 109, ¶¶ 4-18, 527 P.2d 14, 15-17
(upholding a state law that made cities with populations over two hundred thousand liable for
torts arising from government action, even though it affected only Oklahoma City); Barrett v.
Bd. of County Comm’rs, 1939 OK 68, ¶¶ 10-20, 90 P.2d 442, 445-47 (striking an additional
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cast doubt on the value of existing case law,40 the development of special law
jurisprudence in Oklahoma has exhibited a degree of consistency.41 From the
earliest days of statehood, the Oklahoma judiciary manifested a desire to
simultaneously uphold the competing interests of special law prohibitions and
judicial deference.42 To accomplish this, case law prior to City of Enid often
addressed all the relevant constitutional challenges within one holding.43
Despite the confusion promulgated by this method of analysis, a careful
examination of precedent reveals consistent holdings on both section 46 and
section 59 challenges.
1. Challenges to Article 5, Section 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution
Since territorial times, the Oklahoma judiciary has understood the
prohibition against enumerated local and special laws to be absolute.44 As a
result, inquiries into legislation covering these forbidden areas inherently
revolved around characterizing the legislation as either permissibly general or
impermissibly special.45 Should the determination be made that the legislation
at issue is a general law then the inquiry ends and the legislation passes muster
under article 5, section 46.46 Thus, the dispositive question concerns the
definition of a special law.

state levy on land affected by prior federal judgments); Key v. Donnell, 1924 OK 996, ¶ 2, 231
P. 546, 547-48 (finding unconstitutional a law that gave cities over ninety thousand in
population, which affected only Oklahoma City, the same amount of judges as cities having
between thirty-five thousand and forty-five thousand in population); Burks v. Walker, 1909 OK
317, ¶ 1, 109 P. 544, 544 (upholding an act of the legislature establishing a county court for
each county of the state having a population of thirty thousand and a city therein of eight
thousand).
40. Reynolds, ¶ 16, 760 P.2d at 822 (recognizing that both the courts and attorneys have
confused the requirements of article 5, sections 46 and 59 when a statute is simultaneously
attacked under both provisions); see also Maule v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 9, 1985 OK 110, 714
P.2d 198.
41. It should be noted that in City of Enid, the Oklahoma Supreme Court cited no less than
twenty-eight of its own prior decisions concerning special and local laws in its efforts to bolster
the rational-relationship test articulated in Burks. City of Enid v. Pub. Employees Relations
Bd., 2006 OK 16, ¶ 15 n.7, 133 P.3d 281, 287 n.7 (per curiam). See generally Burks v. Walker,
1909 OK 317, ¶ 23, 109 P. 544, 549 (providing the rational-relationship test for determining
whether a law that operates on a class of people is general in nature).
42. See Burks, ¶ 23, 109 P. at 549.
43. See Reynolds, ¶ 16, 760 P.2d at 822. Special laws can, and generally are, challenged
under both sections 46 and 59 of article 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution.
44. See Guthrie Daily Leader v. Cameron, 1895 OK 71, ¶ 30, 41 P. 635, 638.
45. See Reynolds, ¶¶ 13-17, 760 P.2d at 821-23.
46. See OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 46.
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In the seminal case of Key v. Donnell, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
revisited the body of its previous judgments to announce a definitive approach
to differentiating permissible general from impermissible special and local
legislation.47 In Key, a statute rife with specific population parameters sought
to reduce the number of municipal judges in Oklahoma City to a level lower
than other cities half its size.48 The court held that “from an examination of
the authorities, which are almost unanimous,” the state legislature could
promulgate general laws that classified municipalities by population,49
provided the classification was not “arbitrary and capricious, and b[ore] some
reasonable, rational relation to the subject-matter.”50 Even so, the Key court
struck down the offending statute for employing the classification by
population as a “subterfuge for the purpose of passing a special law under the
form of a general law.”51 Therefore, the court simultaneously pronounced its
continued adherence to judicial deference while unmistakably denouncing an
impermissible special and local law under article 5, section 46.52
The case of Lowden v. Oklahoma County Excise Board53 upheld the
inclusion of the rational basis test into the article 5, section 46 analysis. In
Lowden, a population-based state levy aimed at funding public officers applied
exclusively to Oklahoma County.54 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
only upon finding that a classification of counties by population was “clearly
capricious and arbitrary” would the court be “justified in holding that these
constitutional provisions [(i.e., article 5, sections 32, 46, and 59)] were
violated.”55 The court upheld the levy, while unambiguously classifying a law
affecting only one county as general through a rational basis analysis.56
A litany of similar cases support the contention that even under a challenge
to section 46, “whether a particular law is impermissibly special or
permissibly general necessitates a determination of whether the Legislature’s
47. Key v. Donnell, 1924 OK 996, 231 P. 546.
48. Id. ¶ 2, 231 P. at 547.
49. The enactment in question clearly concerned the provision of article 5, section 46 of the
Oklahoma Constitution, dealing with cities and counties.
50. Key, ¶ 2, 231 P. at 547.
51. Id. ¶ 5, 231 P. at 549. The statute also violated article 5, section 46 by regulating the
jurisdiction of the courts and salaries of the judges. See id. (“[T]he rest of the act in question
fixing the salary and jurisdiction of the court is likewise invalid . . . .”).
52. Id.
53. 1940 OK 134, 100 P.2d 448.
54. Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 100 P.2d at 449-50.
55. Id. ¶ 9, 100 P.2d at 450.
56. Id. ¶ 8, 100 P.2d at 450 (stating that a law that affects only one municipality when it is
enacted is not on its face unconstitutional; the test is whether other municipalities can be
included, or are forever excluded).
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classification is reasonable.”57 Whether the issue was upholding a legislative
act that provided for the construction of improvements in towns having a
population of more than one thousand,58 sustaining a statute fixing
jurisdictional authority for justices in counties whose population exceeded one
hundred fifty thousand,59 or upholding an act that rendered cities with over
two hundred thousand inhabitants liable for torts arising out of their
governmental functions,60 the Oklahoma Supreme Court has uniformly
employed a rational basis test to ascertain whether the legislative enactment
was special or general on its face. Furthermore, in striking down legislation
based on a section 46 challenge, the court has cited the arbitrary and
capricious nature of the classification therein adopted.61 Hence, while the
impenetrable barriers erected by article 5, section 46, retain their potency, the
threshold question of what constitutes a general and special law has been
understood by Oklahoma courts within the classic paradigm of judicial
deference.62
2. Challenges to Article 5, Section 59 of the Oklahoma Constitution
Precedent surrounding article 5, section 59 challenges has evolved with
many of the familiar trappings of article 5, section 46 jurisprudence.
Fundamentally, where article 5, section 46 was drafted to absolutely prohibit
the enactment of special laws in twenty-eight specific areas, article 5, section
59 generally permits the legislature to pass special laws when a general law
is not applicable.63 Nevertheless, the Oklahoma courts have often obscured
the boundaries between the enumerated prohibitions of section 46 and the
requirement of general laws found in section 59.64 In one of the state’s earliest
decisions, the Oklahoma Supreme Court chose to analyze county-based
legislation, otherwise specifically barred by article 5, section 46, under the
rubric of section 59, declaring that a law “may be general and have a local
57. City of Enid v. Pub. Employees Relations Bd., 2006 OK 16, ¶ 19, 133 P.3d 281, 296
(Edmondson, J., concurring).
58. See Pointer v. Town of Chelsea, 1927 OK 9, 257 P. 785.
59. See Sanchez v. Melvin, 1966 OK 116, 418 P.2d 639.
60. See Hamilton v. Oklahoma City, 1974 OK 109, 527 P.2d 14.
61. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Hale, 1939 OK 11, ¶ 11, 86 P.2d 305, 307.
62. Burks v. Walker, 1909 OK 317, ¶¶ 31-32, 109 P. 544, 550-51 (concluding that courts
should not lightly declare acts unconstitutional, and stating that courts should resolve doubts
about constitutionality in favor of the legislature).
63. See Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 13, 760 P.2d 816, 822.
64. See City of Enid v. Pub. Employees Relations Bd., 2006 OK 16, ¶¶ 23-25, 133 P.3d
281, 297-98 (Edmondson, J., concurring) (noting how the court’s previous opinions often
addressed simultaneous challenges to article 5, sections 46 and 59, and how the analysis
commingled between the questions).
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application or apply to a designated class if it operates equally upon all the
subjects within the class for which it was adopted.”65 This approach to article
5, section 59 challenges approximated the court’s handling of section 46
challenges, and took on even greater resemblance when the court held in a
section 59 case that “[t]he all important factor in determining whether a bill
is local or general is the basis of classification contained in it.”66 Further
developments in article 5, section 59 decisions also reflected the jurisprudence
of section 46, as the court legitimated reasonable classifications that were not
“arbitrary and capricious” and pertained “to some peculiarity in the subject
matter calling for the legislation” as general laws.67 The analytical boundaries
between the itemized proscriptions of section 46 and the requirement of
general laws found in section 59 remained ambiguous until the Oklahoma
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Reynolds v. Porter.68
In Reynolds, the Oklahoma Supreme Court integrated previous case law on
article 5, sections 46 and 59 and formulated a comprehensive litmus test.69
The Reynolds court examined whether a legislative enactment creating a
separate statute of limitations for a special class of tortfeasors could stand
against Oklahoma’s special law prohibitions.70 While the court focused its
primary holding on article 5, section 46 grounds, the court also held that under
a section 59 challenge, a three-prong inquiry would determine
constitutionality.71
Under the Reynolds test, a court must first determine whether challenged
legislation is a special or general law.72 To do so, a court must identify the
class involved, and analyze whether the classification relates to all or
particular persons or things of a class.73 The court held that “[t]he number of
persons or things upon which the law has a direct effect may be very few, but
it must operate uniformly upon all brought within the class by common
circumstances.”74 Next, if the court finds the challenged law special or local,
65. Burks, ¶ 23, 109 P. at 549 (upholding a law affecting only counties with a population
of thirty thousand and with a city of eight thousand located therein).
66. State ex rel. Nesbitt v. Dist. Court of Mayes County, 1967 OK 228, ¶ 6, 440 P.2d 700,
705 (invalidating a statute that provided additional remuneration to county officers in counties
whose population was between 20,000 and 20,400), overruled by Beidleman v. Belford, 1974
OK 72, 525 P.2d 649, and Palmer v. Belford, 1974 OK 73, 527 P.2d 589.
67. Burks, ¶ 23, 109 P. at 549.
68. 1988 OK 88, 760 P.2d 816.
69. Id. ¶ 13, 760 P.2d at 822.
70. Id. ¶ 1, 760 P.2d at 818.
71. Id. ¶ 13, 760 P.2d at 822.
72. Id.
73. Id. ¶ 14, 760 P.2d at 822.
74. Id. (citing Grable v. Childers, 1936 OK 273, 56 P.2d 357).
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the court must determine whether the legislature could fashion a general law
to accomplish the same goal.75 Finally, if the legislature could not craft a
general law, then the court must examine whether the statute is a permissible
special law.76 This examination requires the court to resolve whether the
special legislation reasonably relates to a valid legislative objective.77 The
court related this holding to article 5, section 46 challenges by stating that a
constitutional review under those auspices stops at the first prong of the
Reynolds inquiry.78 It does so because article 5, section 46 “absolutely and
unequivocally” prohibits passage of special laws in enumerated areas,
including local laws, while also guaranteeing that a general law in those areas
would always be applicable.79 Thus, the Reynolds case brought the two lines
of Oklahoma special law jurisprudence into harmony with one established
litmus test.
III. City of Enid v. Public Employees Relations Board
A. Background of the Case
The Oklahoma Legislature passed the Oklahoma Municipal Employee
Collective Bargaining Act80 (the Act) in 2004. In the interests of promoting
“orderly and constructive employment relations between municipal employers
and their employees,”81 the Act afforded qualifying municipal employees the
right to organize and choose representation for the purpose of collective
bargaining.82 The Act also obligated municipal employers to recognize and
negotiate with the employees’ chosen representatives.83 The Act defined
qualifying municipal employers as municipalities with populations greater
than thirty-five thousand,84 thereby including Broken Arrow, Edmond,
Lawton, Midwest City, Moore, Muskogee, Norman, Oklahoma City,
Stillwater, Tulsa, and most notably, Enid.85 The Act was to be administered
75. Id. ¶ 13, 760 P.2d at 822.
76. Id.
77. Id. ¶ 16, 760 P.2d at 822.
78. Id. ¶ 17, 760 P.2d at 822.
79. See id.
80. Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act, ch. 62, 2004 Okla. Sess.
Laws 330 (codified at 11 OKLA. STAT. §§ 51-201 to -220 (Supp. 2006)).
81. 11 OKLA. STAT. § 51-201 (stating that it is the “public policy of this state and the
purpose of the Legislature in the enactment of this act to promote orderly and constructive
employment relations between municipal employers and their employees” (footnote omitted)).
82. Id. § 51-201(1).
83. Id. § 51-201(2).
84. Id. § 51-202(12).
85. City of Enid v. Pub. Employees Relations Bd., No. SD-101,729, 2005 Okla. LEXIS 57,
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by the Public Employees Relations Board (PERB),86 and as envisioned by the
legislature, was to take effect on November 1, 2004.87
On November 1, 2004, the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (the Union) requested certification from the PERB to
represent the City of Enid's qualifying employees.88 Three days later, on
November 4, 2004, the PERB gave notice to the City of Enid concerning the
Union’s request and directed city officials to post the notice.89 Pursuant to the
PERB's emergency rules, the PERB was required to certify the Union as the
representative of Enid’s municipal employees unless the PERB obtained a
request from a competing union within fifteen days.90
On November 19, 2004, the same day the PERB was required to certify the
Union, the City of Enid filed suit against both the PERB and the Union
seeking a temporary restraining order, temporary and permanent injunctions,
and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the Oklahoma
Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act under article 5, sections 46
and 59, and article 18, section 3(a) of the Oklahoma Constitution.91 At a
hearing on November 22, 2004, the Oklahoma County District Court issued
a temporary restraining order.92 Soon after, the City of Enid filed a timely
motion for summary judgment.93
On summary judgment, the district court found that the classification of
municipalities with populations greater than thirty-five thousand violated both
article 5, sections 46 and 59 of the Oklahoma Constitution.94 In its article 5,
section 46 analysis, the court found that the classification of municipalities
with populations greater than thirty-five thousand for collective bargaining
purposes was arbitrary and thus constituted a special law in violation of article
5, sections 46 and 59.95 Under the framework of article 5, section 59, the
court found that the Act was an unconstitutional special law because it was

at *3 (Okla. July 5, 2005), withdrawn and substituted by 2006 OK 16, 133 P.3d 281 (per
curiam).
86. 11 OKLA. STAT. § 51-204(1); see also id. §§ 51-101, -104 (outlining the purpose and
composition of the Oklahoma Public Employees Relations Board).
87. City of Enid v. Pub. Employees Relations Bd., 2006 OK 16, ¶ 3, 133 P.3d 281, 284 (per
curiam).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. ¶ 4, 133 P.3d at 284.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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possible to design a general law to accomplish the same goal.96 Consequently,
the court issued a permanent injunction against the PERB, from which the
Union appealed and the PERB joined as co-appellant.97 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court retained the appeal and heard oral arguments on May 10,
2005.98
B. Question for the Court
The primary issue in City of Enid concerned whether the classification in
the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act of “municipal
employers” as municipalities with populations greater than thirty-five
thousand violated the special and local law prohibitions of the Oklahoma
Constitution.99 The City of Enid also challenged the Act in light of
Oklahoma’s “home-rule doctrine,”100 but this issue proved to be tertiary.101
Instead, the City of Enid court framed its decision around the challenges to
article 5, sections 46 and 59 of the Oklahoma Constitution.102 In doing so, the
court had to resolve several interdependent issues. First, the court had to
ascertain how general and special law classifications specifically applied to
state legislation concerning municipalities.103 Second, the court had to
interpret how the Reynolds criteria104 and rational-relation precedent under
article 5, sections 46 and 59 affected the permissibility of such legislation.105

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. The standard practice of all Oklahoma appellate courts is to render decisions based
on written pleadings. Oral arguments are extremely rare. See OKLA. SUP. CT. R. 1.9 (requiring
a party who desires to present oral argument before the appellate courts to file a motion for oral
argument “setting forth the exceptional reason that oral argument is necessary”).
99. See id. ¶ 6, 133 P.3d at 285.
100. See OKLA. CONST. art. 18, § 3(a). The section provides in pertinent part that “[a]ny city
containing a population of more than two thousand inhabitants may frame a charter for its own
government . . . . Upon . . . approval it shall become the organic law of such city and supersede
any existing charter and all amendments thereof and all ordinances inconsistent with it.” Id.
101. City of Enid, ¶ 25, 133 P.3d at 290 (recognizing that the legislature has determined that
the promotion of orderly and constructive collective bargaining between municipal employers
and their employees is a matter of state-wide public policy, and therefore, not in conflict with
article 18, section 3 of the Oklahoma Constitution).
102. See id. ¶¶ 7-19, 133 P.3d at 286-89. Article 5, section 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution
states that the legislature may not pass laws “[r]egulating the affairs . . . of cities.” OKLA.
CONST. art. 5, § 46. Section 59 provides that “[l]aws of a general nature shall have a uniform
operation throughout the State, and where a general law can be made applicable, no special law
shall be enacted.” Id. § 59 (footnotes omitted).
103. City of Enid, ¶¶ 10-12, 133 P.3d at 286-87.
104. See Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, ¶¶ 13-17, 760 P.2d 816, 822.
105. See City of Enid, ¶¶ 9, 15, 133 P.3d at 286-87.
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Finally, after determining the proper framework for analysis, the court had to
decide if the Act, on its merits, met the parameters of this construct.
C. Decision of the Court
The Oklahoma Supreme Court found the Oklahoma Municipal Employee
Collective Bargaining Act constitutional under article 5, sections 46 and 59,
and article 18, section 3(a) of the state constitution.106 Applying the Reynolds
test, the per curiam opinion held that article 5, section 46 “in no way precludes
the classification of cities into similarly situated municipalities based on
population when the legislature, in its wisdom, has a legitimate, reasonable
and rational reason to do so.”107 Furthermore, by finding that the two-part
rational-relationship test of Burks represented the appropriate test under both
section 46 and section 59 challenges,108 the court held that the Act’s
population classification was “not arbitrary or capricious” and moreover, that
the classification was “rationally related to the stated purpose of the
legislation.”109 Although the trial court never reviewed the challenge under
article 18, section 3(a),110 the Oklahoma Supreme Court disposed of the issue
by stating that that the “collective bargaining between municipal employers
and their employees is a matter . . . of state-wide concern.”111 Fundamentally,
because the Act allocated “the same privileges to all municipalities of the
same class” and manifested “uniform application to all class members,” the
Act was ruled constitutional on its face.112
D. Rationale of the Court
Despite reaching a just resolution, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the
Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act on novel grounds.
106. See id. ¶ 26, 133 P.3d at 290. See also OKLA. CONST. art. 18, § 3(a), which states in
pertinent part:
XXxAny city containing a population of more than two thousand inhabitants may
frame a charter for its own government, consistent with and subject to the
Constitution and laws of this State . . . . [I]t shall thereafter be submitted to the
Governor for his approval, and the Governor shall approve the same if it shall not
be in conflict with the Constitution and laws of this State. Upon such approval it
shall become the organic law of such city and supersede any existing charter and
all amendments thereof and all ordinances inconsistent with it.
107. City of Enid, ¶ 9, 133 P.3d at 286.
108. Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 133 P.3d at 287 (citing Burks v. Walker, 1909 OK 317, ¶ 23, 109 P. 544,
549).
109. Id. ¶ 26, 133 P.3d at 290.
110. Id. ¶ 6, 133 P.3d at 285.
111. Id. ¶ 25, 133 P.3d at 290.
112. Id. ¶ 26, 133 P.3d at 290.
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Indeed, the per curiam opinion offered uncommon justifications to support its
holding that the Act was a general law within the meaning of court
precedents.113 Moreover, the justices were anything but unanimous in their
decision. Only five justices joined in the court’s opinion,114 while one justice
concurred by his own writing.115 Conversely, four dissenting justices and two
dissenting opinions vigorously assailed the findings of the majority.116
The per curiam opinion in City of Enid validated the Oklahoma Municipal
Employee Collective Bargaining Act on three legal theories. First, the court
sought to demonstrate that “not all [legislative] classification in proportion to
population is prohibited.”117 To achieve this, the court cited its ruling in
Edmonds v. Town of Haskell,118 where the court held that express authority
existed within the legislature, under article 18, section 1 of the Oklahoma
Constitution, to enact public works programs in cities with populations in
excess of one thousand people.119 Coupled with the provision in article 5,
section 46 which states that “[t]he Legislature shall not, except as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law,”120 the court
argued that the powers vested in the legislative branch by article 18 allowed
the legislature to legislate based on population.121 Next, the court sought to
establish that the rational-relationship test governed inquiries into challenges
under both section 46 and section 59 of article 5. In this pursuit, the court
combined a reading of Reynolds, which mandated that the threshold inquiry
under article 5, section 46 concerns defining the classification included in the
challenged legislation,122 with a reading of Burks, which held that where
legislation “operates upon a class, the classification must not be capricious or
113. Id. ¶¶ 10-12, 133 P.3d at 286-87 (invoking the “except as otherwise provided” language
of article 5, section 46, and employing this phrase as evidence that not all classification in
proportion to population is prohibited).
114. Id. ¶¶ 1-26, 133 P.3d at 281-90 (per curiam).
115. Id. ¶¶ 1-36, 133 P.3d at 290-302 (Edmondson, J., concurring).
116. Id. ¶¶ 1-8, 133 P.3d at 303-05 (Opala, J., dissenting); id. ¶¶ 1-30, 133 P.3d at 305-12
(Taylor, J., dissenting).
117. Id. ¶ 12, 133 P.3d at 286 (per curiam).
118. Id. ¶ 11, 133 P.3d at 286 (citing Edmonds v. Town of Haskell, 1926 OK 289, ¶ 9, 247
P. 15, 17-18).
119. Edmonds, ¶ 9, 247 P. at 17-18. Article 18, section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution
provides that “[m]unicipal corporations shall not be created by special laws, but the Legislature,
by general laws shall provide for the incorporation and organization of cities and towns and the
classification of same in proportion to population, subject to the provisions of this article.”
OKLA. CONST. art. 18, § 1 (footnotes omitted).
120. OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 46 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
121. See City of Enid, ¶ 12, 133 P.3d at 286.
122. See id. ¶ 9, 133 P.3d at 286 (citing Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 18 & n.36, 760
P.2d 816, 823 & n.36); see also Reynolds, ¶¶ 13-17, 760 P.2d at 822.
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arbitrary and must be reasonable.”123 Finally, with this framework in place,
the court undertook the final task of proving that the Act constituted a
reasonable, rational piece of legislation. To bolster this argument, the court
examined trial court documents supporting the premise that smaller
municipalities have fewer layers of management, fewer resources to engage
in collective bargaining, smaller budgets, and less personnel available to
facilitate the negotiation process.124 Ruling on these three grounds, the court
held the Act constitutional.125
Justice Edmondson, who wrote “to provide a more detailed explanation
why the Court's opinion is correct,”126 authored the lone concurrence in City
of Enid. His concurring opinion scrutinized the original understanding of
general, special, and local laws in Oklahoma jurisprudence.127 Additionally,
Justice Edmondson clarified the threshold inquiry outlined in Reynolds by
stating that “every § 46 claim involves identifying a class.”128 Highlighting
the centrality of classification in the article 5, section 46 analysis, he
postulated that “[w]hether the classification drawn by the Legislature is
reasonable is part of defining whether a particular law is special, local, or
general.”129 Having concurred with the court’s holding that the Act’s
classification based on population represented rational, reasonable legislation,
Justice Edmondson found the trial court’s injunction “contrary to law.”130
Writing in dissent, Justice Opala criticized the per curiam opinion on
multiple grounds.131 Justice Opala attacked the court’s interpretation of
legislative power under article 18, section 1 and declared that the court’s
expansion of the permissive language contained in article 5, section 46 to
obligatory acts “expands the exception to swallow the rule.”132 Moreover,
Justice Opala accused the court of “applying a § 59 analysis to a § 46 legal

123. City of Enid, ¶ 14, 133 P.3d at 287 (quoting Burks v. Walker, 1909 OK 317, ¶ 23, 109
P. 544, 549).
124. Id. ¶ 16, 133 P.3d at 288 (referencing expert affidavits entered at the trial court level).
125. Id. ¶ 26, 133 P.3d at 290.
126. Id. ¶ 1, 133 P.3d at 290 (Edmondson, J., concurring).
127. Id. ¶¶ 5-15, 133 P.3d at 291-95.
128. Id. ¶ 26, 133 P.3d at 298; see also Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 17, 760 P.2d 816,
822-23.
129. City of Enid, ¶ 19, 133 P.3d at 296 (Edmondson, J., concurring).
130. Id. ¶ 36, 133 P.3d at 303.
131. Id. ¶¶ 1-8, 133 P.3d at 303-05 (Opala, J., dissenting). Voicing his displeasure with the
court’s ruling, Justice Opala took the uncommon approach of dissenting “from the court’s
judgment, from its pronouncement, and from the statement in concurrence.” Id. ¶ 8, 133 P.3d
at 305.
132. Id. ¶ 3, 133 P.3d at 304 (emphasis omitted).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007

208

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:191

problem for which they fashioned a falsely-crafted dichotomy.”133 As
corollary arguments, Justice Opala also assailed the Act for not achieving its
intent of providing collective bargaining for “employees of all municipalities
in the State of Oklahoma” and for purporting to deal with a matter of
statewide concern while simultaneously having a local application.134
Correspondingly, Justice Opala declared that the Act represented a “special
law on a constitutionally impermissible subject.”135
Justice Taylor also filed a dissent that found the Act unconstitutional under
article 5, sections 46 and 59.136 Focusing on the “absolute and unequivocal”
nature of the article 5, section 46 prohibitions,137 Justice Taylor declared that
section 46 “requires any statute ‘regulating the affairs of cities’ to operate
upon all ‘cities’ throughout the state so as not to be a special law.”138 In
addition, Justice Taylor blasted the per curiam opinion for rendering article
5, section 59 “ineffective” and for enveloping section 46 into an ineffective
section 59.139 Supported by a competing perspective on original
understanding,140 as well as the conviction that “[t]here are no distinct
differences between public works employees in some cities and public works
employees in other cities,”141 Justice Taylor opined that the court’s opinion
substantiated “the very legislative mischief that the constitutional framers
attempted to prevent.”142 Thus, while the per curiam opinion and concurrence
upheld the Act as a permissible and rational exercise of population-based
legislation, the dissenting justices argued that legislation into municipalities
represents a constitutionally impermissible subject, and alternatively, that any
legislation into municipalities must bear universal application.
IV. Analysis
The City of Enid court rendered the appropriate decision in three respects.
First, the court correctly interpreted the original understanding of Oklahoma’s
133. Id. ¶ 4, 133 P.3d at 304 (emphasis omitted).
134. Id. ¶¶ 5-6, 133 P.3d at 304 (emphasis omitted).
135. Id. ¶ 7, 133 P.3d at 305.
136. Id. ¶ 1, 133 P.3d at 305 (Taylor, J., dissenting).
137. Id. ¶ 8, 133 P.3d at 306 (emphasis omitted).
138. Id. ¶ 6, 133 P.3d at 306 (quoting OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 46).
139. Id. ¶ 30, 133 P.3d at 311.
140. Id. ¶¶ 12-21, 133 P.3d at 307-10 (describing the prototype of Oklahoma’s special law
prohibitions as emerging from Kansas, and citing early Kansas case law, accompanied by a
treatise and several other legal sources, as bolstering an absolutist view toward special law
prohibitions).
141. Id. ¶ 26, 133 P.3d at 311. Interestingly, Justice Taylor offered no evidence to support
this contention.
142. Id. ¶ 30, 133 P.3d at 311.
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special and local law prohibitions. Second, the court premised its holding on
a logical extrapolation of the Reynolds precedent and its focus on
classification. Third, the court crafted the proper definition of what
constitutes a general law.
Despite reaching a just result, the City of Enid court erred in two critical
aspects. First, the court confused the analysis required in an article 5, section
46 challenge, with the analysis required in article 5, section 59 challenge.
More importantly, the court issued an opinion limited in both scope and
quality. Consequently, while the City of Enid court may have reached a just
decision, it did so at the expense of precedential value.
A. Framers’ Intent
To accurately interpret the special and local law prohibitions of the
Oklahoma Constitution, the judiciary must observe the fundamental principles
that support it.143 While the constitution established a framework for growth,
the meaning of the constitution was fixed when it was adopted.144
Consequently, judicial construction must be in accord with the intent of the
framers and the people who adopted the constitution.145 This intent emerges
most notably from the constitution itself, and courts are not empowered to
search for the meaning of a provision beyond the constitution when the text
of the provision is unambiguous.146
As a rule, when provisions that are analogous to those of other states have
been adopted into the Oklahoma Constitution, Oklahoma courts presume that
the framers were acquainted with, and intended to adopt, the constructions of
those provisions in other states.147 This proposition recognizes that if the
legislature intended to alter a previously familiar practice, then it would have
specifically done so in fashioning the body of the Oklahoma Constitution.148
The interpretation of special and local law prohibitions among state courts at
the time of Oklahoma statehood demonstrated a deferential understanding of
the meanings of general, special, and local laws, as well as an
143. Draper v. State, 1980 OK 117, ¶ 8, 621 P.2d 1142, 1145.
144. Wimberly v. Deacon, 1943 OK 432, ¶ 13, 144 P.2d 447, 450.
145. Draper, ¶ 8, 621 P.2d at 1145; see also Simpson v. Dixon, 1993 OK 71, 853 P.2d 176
(touting framers’ intent when analyzing municipal election laws); Latting v. Cordell, 1946 OK
217, 172 P.2d 397 (emphasizing the framers’ intent in election law and how it concerned names
placed on the ballot for a state senate seat).
146. Draper, ¶ 8, 621 P.2d at 1145-46; see also McCurtain County Excise Bd. v. St. LouisS.F. Ry. Co., 1959 OK 100, ¶ 17, 340 P.2d 213, 216.
147. Wimberly, ¶ 13, 144 P.2d at 450; see also State ex rel. Tharel v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 1940
OK 468, ¶ 16, 107 P.2d 542, 549; Baker v. Newton, 1908 OK 232, ¶ 2, 98 P. 931, 932 (setting
the trend for future Oklahoma Supreme Court analysis based on the theory of parallel meaning).
148. See Wimberly, ¶ 13, 144 P.2d at 450; see also Baker, 1908 OK 232, 98 P. 931.
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acknowledgment of the state’s role in municipal affairs.149 Furthermore, state
supreme courts validated instances in which state legislatures rationally
legislated in municipal affairs based specifically on population.150
Accordingly, prior to the holding in City of Enid, the weight of Oklahoma
Supreme Court decisions construed the definitions of special and local laws
for purposes of their respective constitutional prohibitions under the rubric of
the rational basis analysis.151
The City of Enid court properly held that the Oklahoma Constitution
forbids the enactment of impermissibly special and local laws by the state
legislature.152 Even so, the decision recognized that sections of the
constitution specifically assign to the state legislature the authority to legislate
into county and municipal affairs.153 Reflecting this dichotomy, one
legislative committee remarked that while the state legislature is generally
forbidden to legislate into local affairs, constitutional inconsistencies left the
boundaries of this constraint in doubt.154 What these observers, and the
149. See Butler v. City of Lewiston, 83 P. 234 (Idaho 1905) (affirming the right of the state
to pass general laws affecting city charters); Chi. Terminal Transfer Ry. Co. v. Greer, 79 N.E.
46 (Ill. 1906) (upholding a state statute providing for organization of city courts in cities based
on population); State v. Rogers, 106 N.W. 345 (Minn. 1906) (affirming the ability of the state
legislature to set district court levies based on population, while emphasizing that the decision
was based on the rationality of the legislature’s action, and its lack of arbitrariness); Coffey v.
City of Carthage, 98 S.W. 562 (Mo. 1906) (upholding the constitutionality of the state
legislature’s enactment of county-specific judicial processes). Contra State ex rel. Kinsey v.
Messerly, 95 S.W. 913 (Mo. 1906) (striking a state compensation scheme that specifically
allocated funds to one city in the state); State v. Scott, 100 N.W. 812 (Neb. 1904) (striking a
state law regulating a county office because it set the parameters for the law’s effect by utilizing
the census of 1900 only, while also noting that a general law can plainly be made applicable to
all counties having the required population, without the limitation to those which had a
population of fifty thousand in the census of 1900); State v. Burns, 52 S.E. 960 (S.C. 1906)
(striking part of a state law that fixed compensation for one county officer in a specific county).
150. See supra note 150.
151. See Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 1987 OK 114, ¶ 62, 746 P.2d 1135,
1150 (explaining the broad powers of the Oklahoma legislature and the tradition of rational
basis analysis in a school district finance case); Elias v. City of Tulsa, 1965 OK 164, ¶¶ 9-10,
408 P.2d 517, 519-20 (enlisting the rational basis analysis to decide the constitutionality of a
rezoning scheme); see also State ex rel. Nesbitt v. Rockwell, 1968 OK 78, 443 P.2d 104 (using
the rational basis test to strike unconstitutional ad valorem taxes).
152. See City of Enid v. Pub. Employees Relations Bd., 2006 OK 16, ¶ 7, 133 P.3d 281,
285-86 (per curiam); see also OKLA. CONST. art. 5, §§ 46, 59.
153. See City of Enid, ¶¶ 10-11, 133 P.3d at 286 (referencing the express authority of article
18, section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution); see also OKLA. CONST. arts. 17-18.
154. John Paul Duncan, County Government — An Analysis, in OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTIONAL
STUDIES OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTIONAL SURVEY AND CITIZEN ADVISORY COMMITTEES 417,
426 (H.V. Thornton ed., 1950) [hereinafter OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES]; see also OKLA.
CONST. art. 17, § 2 (allowing for the state legislature to specifically create and change county
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dissenters in City of Enid, failed to recognize was that Oklahoma’s populist155
framers feared government abuses at all levels, including local and county
assemblies.156 Delegates to Oklahoma’s constitutional convention sought to
“provide for the largest measure of local control consistent with the interests
of the State,”157 and the delegates were similarly meticulous in declaring
counties and townships to be “the auxiliaries of the State in the important
business of Municipal rule.”158 This appreciation of the state role in local
affairs was sustained through Oklahoma’s first legislature, where
representatives steeped in the constitution enacted municipal legislation based
on population.159 Subsequent legislatures continued to enact population-based
municipal legislation that satisfied state aims.160 Thus, while the framers of
Oklahoma’s constitution sought to protect municipalities from discriminatory
legislation, their understanding of the state role in municipal governance does
not support the contention of Justice Taylor’s dissent that they intended to
absolutely preclude the legislature from enacting laws classifying
municipalities based on population.161 Moreover, the court’s adoption of a
classification-centered inquiry in Reynolds further undercuts Justice Taylor’s
flawed proposition.
B. The Reynolds Precedent and the Primacy of Classification
The City of Enid court properly construed the Reynolds interpretation of
protected classes for the purpose of Oklahoma’s special and local law
prohibitions.162 In Reynolds, the Oklahoma Supreme Court looked to English
legal tradition to inform its analysis of permissible subdivisions of civil
officers).
155. The term “populism” can be defined as “representation or extolling of the common
person, the working class, the underdog, etc.” THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1505 (Stuart Berg Flexner & Leonore Crary Hauck eds., 2d ed. 1987).
156. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE PROPOSED STATE OF
OKLAHOMA 18-22 (Muskogee Printing Co. 1907) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION].
157. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 438.
159. See City of Enid v. Pub. Employees Relations Bd., 2006 OK 16, ¶ 17, 133 P.3d 281 at
288 (per curiam).
160. See case cited supra note 39 (showing some population-based statutes that were
challenged and sustained in court).
161. See City of Enid, ¶ 6, 133 P.3d at 306 (Taylor, J., dissenting) (relating his opinion that
article 5, section 46 requires any statute regulating the affairs of cities to operate on all cities
throughout the state). But see Marritz, supra note 10, at 190.
162. See City of Enid, ¶ 9, 133 P.3d at 286 (per curiam) (holding that Reynolds did not
concern a population-based statute, and did not preclude such a classification when the
“legislature, in its wisdom, has a legitimate, reasonable and rational reason to do so”).
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actions, which constitute an expressly protected area under article 5, section
46.163 The Reynolds court struck down the special law in question for being
underinclusive and unreasonable and for “impact[ing] less than an entire class
of similarly situated claimants.”164 Because of this particular focus, however,
the Reynolds court carefully limited its constitutional holding to the
classification challenged in the case.165 As summarized by Justice
Edmondson, “the [Reynolds] Court merely identified ‘negligent tort claims’
as a class from which the Legislature could not create subclasses for the
purpose of limitations.”166 The City of Enid court accounted for these
fundamental, common law dimensions of Reynolds by recognizing that the
Reynolds decision “did not concern a population-based statute, and in no way
precludes the classification of cities into similarly situated municipalities
based on population.”167
The City of Enid court also acknowledged the logical progression of the
Reynolds decision from previous case law. While the Reynolds decision
generated the groundbreaking litmus test for permissible general laws under
the Oklahoma Constitution, it followed previous court rulings by analyzing
whether the classification in question was founded on real and substantial
distinctions and by questioning whether the requirement bore some
reasonable, rational relation to the subject matter.168 Employing the same
classification-centered analysis, the City of Enid court ruled that the Oklahoma
Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act’s population classification
was “rationally related to the stated purpose of the legislation,” was “not
arbitrary or capricious,” and “grant[ed] the same privileges to all
municipalities of the same class.”169 To support this ruling, the court
referenced multiple documents from the trial court that established profound

163. See Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 18, 760 P.2d 816, 823 (stating that to determine
whether a statute operates on an entire class of similarly situated claims, the court must look at
English legal tradition and the common law).
164. Id. ¶ 21, 760 P.2d at 824.
165. Id. ¶ 18, 760 P.2d at 823 n.36 (explaining that “[t]he test we adopt for identifying the
class in measuring the validity of a civil action’s limitation by the strictures in § 46 is not
necessarily applicable to other subjects enumerated in that section”).
166. City of Enid, ¶ 28, 133 P.3d at 299 (Edmondson, J., concurring) (citing Reynolds, ¶ 18,
760 P.2d at 823).
167. See id. ¶ 9, 133 P.3d at 286 (per curiam).
168. See Hamilton v. Oklahoma City, 1974 OK 109, ¶ 7, 527 P.2d 14, 16; see also Sanchez
v. Melvin, 1966 OK 116, 418 P.2d 639; Wilkinson v. Hale, 1939 OK 11, 86 P.2d 305; Pointer
v. Town of Chelsea, 1927 OK 9, 257 P. 785; City of Sapulpa v. Land, 1924 OK 92, 223 P. 640;
Guthrie Daily Leader v. Cameron, 1895 OK 71, 41 P. 635.
169. City of Enid, ¶ 26, 133 P.3d at 290.
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dissimilarities between the operations of smaller and larger municipalities.170
Additionally, the court asserted that “[c]lassification of municipalities by
population is one of those classifications historically recognized as necessary
and appropriate in the state of Oklahoma.”171 Based upon this evidence, the
City of Enid court held that the legislature’s population classification of thirtyfive thousand was “closely related to the object sought to be obtained by the
Act,”172 and the classification “manifest[ed] uniform application to all class
members.”173 By so doing, the Oklahoma Supreme Court not only properly
interpreted the notion of protected classes in Oklahoma special law
jurisprudence, but also rendered an opinion that recognized the primacy of
classification throughout the corpus of special law challenges. Accordingly,
the decision also served to properly distinguish general laws from
impermissible special and local laws.
C. Distinguishing General Laws
Despite the assertions of the City of Enid dissents, the court’s opinion
properly construed the traditional definition of general laws in Oklahoma.
The Oklahoma Constitution provides the framework for analysis by defining
general laws as those which “have a uniform operation throughout the
State.”174 This requirement of uniform operation, however, does not mandate
that a general law apply to every person or to every locality in the state.175
Indeed, since territorial times, Oklahoma courts have held that “[l]aws are
general if they apply to a class,” even if the class is small, so long as the law
170. Id. ¶ 16, 133 P.3d at 288 (detailing trial-level expert testimony that demonstrated
differences in budgeting, workforce complement, layers of management, and institutional
resources among smaller and larger municipalities).
171. Id. ¶ 17, 133 P.3d at 288.
172. Id. ¶ 18, 133 P.3d at 288.
173. Id. ¶ 26, 133 P.3d at 290.
174. OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 59.
175. See Hamilton v. Oklahoma City, 1974 OK 109, 527 P.2d 14 (holding that where the
city did not meet the burden of proving congestion of population was unrelated to the
Governmental Tort Liability Act, which provides that cities with a population of over two
hundred thousand will be liable for their torts arising out of their governmental functions, the
classification by population was not unreasonable and did not contravene the Constitution);
Sanchez v. Melvin, 1966 OK 116, 418 P.2d 639 (ruling that the Legislature may classify for
legislative purposes, but a classification so adopted must be neither arbitrary nor capricious and
must bear a reasonable relation to the object to be accomplished); Wilkinson v. Hale, 1939 OK
11, 86 P.2d 305 (holding that it is not necessary that a general law be universal in its application
and operate the same in every section of the State and upon all persons); Pointer v. Town of
Chelsea, 1927 OK 9, 257 P. 785 (upholding a law which provided for the construction of
improvements in towns having a population of more than one thousand as a general law against
an article 5, section 46 challenge).
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is general in its application and embraces all of the given class.176 Early
Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions sustained the threshold inquiry into
classification by reiterating that general laws need not operate upon every
locality in the state “but must apply equally to all classes similarly situated
and apply to like conditions and subjects.”177 Recent decisions follow this
reasoning by distinguishing general laws upon whether the population
classification in question is founded on real and substantial distinctions and
whether the requirement bears some reasonable, rational relation to the subject
matter.178 Collectively, these decisions bolster the overall policies of judicial
deference and strict construction when construing limitations on legislative
powers.179 Moreover, the decisions recognize that “line-drawing is an
inevitable aspect of the legislative function and that ‘even improvident
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.’”180
Ultimately, these decisions create a body of stare decisis that clearly defers to
the legislature and its ability to reasonably construct classifications based on
rational distinctions.
In City of Enid, the Oklahoma Supreme Court measured the value of stare
decisis against the desire of the dissenting justices to craft a meaningful
application of Oklahoma’s special and local law prohibitions, and the court
ruled in favor of the former. Prior rulings required the City of Enid court to
determine whether the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining
Act applied uniformly to the larger class of municipalities with a population
of thirty-five thousand throughout the state and to ascertain whether the Act
applied equally to all similarly situated entities in the class.181 Precedent also
required the court to discern whether the Act constituted a special law by
distinguishing one group from others in a general class based on arbitrary or
capricious criteria,182 and to ensure that the classification was not used as a
subterfuge for the purpose of passing a special law under the guise of a
general law.183

176. Guthrie Daily Leader v. Cameron, 1895 OK 71, ¶41, 41 P. 635, 639.
177. City of Sapulpa v. Land, 1924 OK 92, ¶ 23, 223 P. 640, 643.
178. Hamilton, ¶ 7, 527 P.2d at 17.
179. Way v. Grand Lake Ass’n, 1981 OK 70, ¶ 39, 635 P.2d 1010, 1017.
180. Gladstone v. Bartlesville Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 30, 2003 OK 30, ¶ 12 n.30, 66 P.3d 442,
448 n.30 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).
181. See generally Hamilton, 1974 OK 109, 527 P.2d 14; Sanchez v. Melvin, 1966 OK 116,
418 P.2d 639; Wilkinson v. Hale, 1939 OK 11, 86 P.2d 305; Pointer v. Town of Chelsea, 1927
OK 9, 257 P. 785; Land, 1924 OK 92, 223 P. 640; Guthrie Daily Leader, 1895 OK 71, 41 P.
635.
182. See Hamilton, ¶ 7, 527 P.2d at 17.
183. See Elias v. City of Tulsa, 1965 OK 164, ¶ 10, 408 P.2d 517, 519-20.
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Rather than endorsing these lines of inquiry, Justice Taylor’s dissent in City
of Enid took the unprecedented position that the Oklahoma Constitution
categorically forbids the state legislature from attempting to classify cities by
population for the purposes of regulating municipal affairs.184 Furthermore,
both dissenting opinions rejected the use of the rational basis examination to
define general and special laws by postulating that article 5, section 46 of the
Oklahoma Constitution recognizes cities as a distinct class of entities, thereby
creating a classification pro tanto that prohibits further division.185 In essence,
the dissenting justices would favor transforming the constitutionally protected
categories of article 5, section 46 into the definition of local and special laws.
By rejecting these arguments and formulating its opinion based on tests
derived from the weight of the court’s past precedent, the City of Enid court
properly found the Act constitutional as a general law. Had the court
concluded its findings with this analysis of article 5, section 46, the body of
special law jurisprudence would have been well served. Nevertheless, the
City of Enid court repeated the folly of previous courts by further analyzing
the challenged law under article 5, section 59.
D. Blurring the Lines Between Article 5, Sections 46 and 59 of the
Oklahoma Constitution
The City of Enid court erred by expanding its inquiry beyond the confines
of article 5, section 46. Plainly stated, the Oklahoma Constitution prohibits
the enactment of special laws where a general law can be fashioned.186
Outside of the twenty-eight areas specifically enumerated in article 5, section
184. See City of Enid v. Pub. Employees Relations Bd., 2006 OK 16, ¶ 2, 133 P.3d 281, 305
(Taylor, J., dissenting) (explaining the dissent’s position that article 5, section 46 operates as
an injunction against the Legislature regulating the affairs of some, but not all, cities). But see
Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 1987 OK 114, ¶ 62, 746 P.2d 1135, 1150
(explaining the broad powers of the Oklahoma legislature and the tradition of rational basis
analysis in a school district finance case); State v. Rockwell, 1968 OK 78, 443 P.2d 104 (using
the rational basis test to strike unconstitutional ad valorem taxes); Elias, ¶¶ 9-10, 408 P.2d at
520 (enlisting the rational basis analysis to decide the constitutionality of a rezoning scheme).
Despite the fact that Justice Taylor would elevate the classification inquiry to one mirroring
strict scrutiny, case law manifestly guides the court toward a rational basis analysis.
185. See City of Enid, ¶ 9, 133 P.3d at 307 (Taylor, J., dissenting) (stating that he would find
that article 5, section 46 classifies municipalities into two groups, cities and towns, and that any
legislation attempting to regulate municipal affairs must affect all cities and/or all towns); id.
¶ 2, 133 P.3d at 303 (Opala, J., dissenting) (stating that cities with a population under thirty-five
thousand must not be accorded preferential and disparate treatment from those with a population
exceeding thirty-five thousand, thereby implying that the only way to avoid this disparate and
preferential treatment is to include all cities within municipal legislation in order to meet the
guidelines of article 5, section 46).
186. OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 59.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007

216

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:191

46 of the Oklahoma Constitution,187 article 5, section 59 provides the backdrop
for analysis. Conversely, when legislation impacts one of the areas
enumerated within article 5, section 46, the restrictions of that prohibition
govern without exception.188 By failing to incorporate this distinction into its
analysis, the City of Enid court detracted from the precedential value of its
opinion.
Ideally, the City of Enid court should have acknowledged that the only
relevant inquiry in the case concerned the challenge to article 5, section 46 of
the Oklahoma Constitution.189 On its face, the Oklahoma Municipal
Employee Collective Bargaining Act seeks to regulate the collective
bargaining rights of municipal employees.190 Additionally, while admissions
of parties in interest cannot bind the court,191 Justice Opala noted that the
appellants arguing to uphold the legislation conceded that the Act regulated
the affairs of cities.192 Therefore, as a matter of constitutional construction,
the per curiam opinion should have noted that the Act concerned one of the
enumerated subjects of article 5, section 46 and restricted the court’s analysis
to this question. Although the court deserves praise for restricting its section
59 analysis to a terse four sentences, the court would have profited from
eschewing a section 59 analysis altogether. Instead, the per curiam opinion
injected an analysis of the Act under article 5, section 59 to provide a
definitional exposition as to why the Act constituted a general law.193 This
mistake only serves to further the confusion that has permeated the Oklahoma
Supreme Court’s treatment of special law prohibitions.194 Furthermore, this
fault legitimates Justice Opala’s contention that the court’s opinion confused
“the prohibition of § 46 with the § 59 analytical framework.”195 Moreover, the
court used the Burks two-part rational-relationship test as the centerpiece of
its constitutional analysis,196 ignoring the fact that this test was carelessly
187. Id. § 46.
188. See Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 17, 760 P.2d 816, 822-23.
189. This note acknowledges that the City of Enid challenged the Act under article 18,
section 3(a) of the Oklahoma Constitution, but as both the opinion and this note state, that
challenge was not dispositive. See City of Enid, ¶¶ 20-25, 133 P.3d at 289-90 (per curiam).
190. See 11 OKLA. STAT. § 51-201 (Supp. 2006).
191. City of Enid, ¶ 29 n.18, 133 P.3d at 299 n.18 (Edmondson, J., concurring) (explaining
how party admissions cannot circumscribe the sovereign power of the court).
192. Id. ¶ 2, 133 P.3d at 303 (Opala, J., dissenting).
193. Id. ¶ 19, 133 P.3d at 288 (per curiam) (finding that the Act granted the same privileges
to all municipalities of the same class, and therefore did not violate article 5, section 59 of the
Oklahoma Constitution).
194. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
195. City of Enid, ¶ 7, 133 P.3d at 305 (Opala, J., dissenting).
196. See id. ¶¶ 14-15, 133 P.3d at 287 (per curiam); see also Burks v. Walker, 1909 OK 317,
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applied throughout Oklahoma case law in both section 46 and section 59
challenges, without distinguishing its particular application to article 5,
section 46.197 Thus, the Oklahoma Supreme Court failed to separate the article
5, section 46 and section 59 challenges and failed to offer supporting case law
free of the confusion between such challenges.
To avoid the error of infusing article 5, section 59 jurisprudence into the
court’s ruling, the City of Enid court should have focused on the threshold
definition of general laws under article 5, section 46. The court properly
noted that article 5, section 59 defines general laws as those that “have a
uniform operation throughout the State.”198 In addition, the court properly
integrated the Burks test, which dictates that “a law may be general and have
a local application or apply to a designated class if it operates equally upon all
the subjects within the class for which it was adopted.”199 Even so, the court
failed to acknowledge that a challenge under article 5, section 46 engenders
an analysis separate from that under article 5, section 59. Rather than simply
stating that the Burks test represented “the appropriate test for today’s
inquiry,”200 the court would have benefited from stating that Burks now
represents the threshold, definitional inquiry into whether a challenged law
represents general or impermissibly special legislation under any article 5,
section 46 challenge. Likewise, the City of Enid court should have avoided
any analysis under article 5, section 59. Any analytical value gleaned from the
language of article 5, section 59 as to the definition of a general law also
exists within the Burks test.201 By heeding these suggestions, the City of Enid
court could have laid the foundations of a distinct article 5, section 46 analysis
that, while reaching the same result in the instant case, could have finally
ended the confusion between challenges under article 5, sections 46 and 59.
In essence, the court could, and should, have constructed the City of Enid test
for use in future challenges under article 5, section 46 of the Oklahoma
Constitution.
¶ 23, 109 P. 544, 549.
197. See City of Enid, ¶ 15 n.7, 133 P.3d at 287 n.7. Of the litany of cases cited by the court
to demonstrate the application of the Burks test, a majority of the cases failed to distinguish how
Burks particularly applied to article 5, section 46 challenges. In fact, many of the cases cited
by the court were dual section 46 and section 59 challenges. Thus, in citing Burks as the focus
of its special law jurisprudence, without any additional extrapolation as to why it bears specific
relevance to article 5, section 46, the court missed a seminal opportunity to clarify prior case
law.
198. OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 59.
199. City of Enid, ¶ 13, 133 P.3d at 287 (quoting Grimes v. Oklahoma City, 2002 OK 47,
¶ 10, 49 P.3d 719, 723); see also Burks, ¶ 23, 109 P. at 549.
200. City of Enid, ¶ 15, 133 P.3d at 287.
201. See Burks, ¶ 23, 109 P. at 549.
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E. Limitations in the Scope and Quality of the Per Curiam Opinion
To the detriment of the case and Oklahoma special law jurisprudence, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court carefully limited its holding in City of Enid to the
facts before the court. Principally, the court evaded an opportunity to grant
the case precedential value by holding that the Burks test was “the appropriate
test for today’s inquiry,” rather than marking Burks as the seminal test for any
article 5, section 46 challenge.202 Furthermore, the case failed to distinguish,
discuss, or overrule any prior aberrational cases.203 Most importantly, the
court limited the significance of its holding by issuing a per curiam opinion.204
Although “[p]er curiam opinions have precedential value as an application of
settled principles of law to facts,” courts will use signed opinions when
announcing new principles of law.205 Thus, rather than creating the City of
Enid test that this note advocates, the City of Enid court issued a
pronouncement with dubious future utility.
The City of Enid opinion may also disserve Oklahoma special law
jurisprudence by further confusing the analytical framework for article 5,
section 46 challenges. In addition to the shortcomings already highlighted,206
the City of Enid court validated legislative authority in municipal affairs
through an amalgamated reading of article 18, section 1 of the Oklahoma
Constitution, the teaching of Edmonds v. Town of Haskell, and the “except as
otherwise provided” language of article 5, section 46 of the Oklahoma
Constitution.207 Despite the accuracy of these holdings, the introduction of
this reasoning led Justice Opala to opine that applying the permissive
language of article 5, section 46 to obligatory acts, such as the Oklahoma
202. City of Enid, ¶ 15, 133 P.3d at 287.
203. To the credit of both dissenting opinions, the dissenting authors proffer arguments that
the court should have answered if the case were intended to harbor future precedential value.
204. City of Enid, 2006 OK 16, 133 P.3d 281.
205. Stanley v. Dep’t of Tax and Revenue, 614 S.E.2d 712, 713 (W. Va. 2005); see also
OKLA. SUP. CT. R. 1.200(c)(1) (providing that every published opinion, which would include
per curiam opinions, has precedential value once a mandate has been issued by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court to publish the opinion in the official reporter, the Pacific Reporter).
206. See supra Part III.D.
207. See City of Enid, ¶¶ 11-12, 133 P.3d at 286; see also OKLA. CONST. art. 18, § 1
(providing that “[m]unicipal corporations shall not be created by special laws, but the
Legislature, by general laws shall provide for the incorporation and organization of cities and
towns and the classification of same in proportion to population, subject to the provisions of this
article”); id. art. 5, § 46 (providing that “[t]he Legislature shall not, except as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law” in any of the twenty-eight
enumerated areas); Edmonds v. Town of Haskell, 1926 OK 289, ¶ 9, 247 P. 5, 17-18 (allowing
cities of over one thousand persons to improve roads and make assessments for these
improvements).
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Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act, “expands the exception to
swallow the rule.”208 Rather than trying to craft exceptions through the
“except as otherwise provided” language, the City of Enid court should have
observed that articles 17 and 18 of the Oklahoma Constitution, in conjunction
with article 5, section 46, vest authority in the legislature to enact county and
municipal legislation, provided that the legislation meets the definition of a
general law under the rubric of Burks.209 Indeed, articles 17 and 18 of the
Oklahoma Constitution empower the legislature to organize and disorganize
both counties and municipalities, to create county offices, to mandate that
counties provide for the needy, to change county boundaries, to remove a
county seat, to incorporate and organize municipalities based on population,
to regulate municipal franchises, and to exercise control over municipal
streets.210 Based on these broadly enumerated powers, the City of Enid court
had no need to invoke the permissive language of article 5, section 46. Having
established that the Act passed the litmus test outlined in Burks, the court had
no further need for substantiating the legislature’s power. By introducing an
unnecessary argument into the article 5, section 46 analysis, the City of Enid
court only served to confuse and limit the quality of its findings.
V. The Impact of City of Enid on State Constitutional Law
On a normative level, the decision in City of Enid harmonized the balance
between legislative accountability and judicial deference that marked the
Oklahoma Supreme Court’s special and local law jurisprudence.211 By
rejecting the dissents’ attempts to shift such a significant sphere of discretion
away from the state legislature, the court recognized the desire of the framers
to hold the legislature to scrupulous lawmaking, while rejecting the notion that
Oklahoma’s special law prohibitions act as a vast grant of lawmaking
authority to municipalities, which the framers considered nothing more than
“the auxiliaries of the State.”212 Early reports communicate the perspective of
the state legislature, which presumed that “local government might well be
cared for by the legislature . . . within the framework of our broad
constitutional liberties.”213 In keeping with this reasoning, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court properly upheld the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

City of Enid, ¶ 3, 133 P.3d at 304 (Opala, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
See OKLA. CONST. arts. 17, 18.
See id.
See Marritz, supra note 10, at 190; see also City of Enid, 2006 OK 16, 133 P.3d 281.
See PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 157, at 438.
John Paul Duncan, County Government — Constitutional Data, in OKLAHOMA
CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES, supra note 155, at 466, 469.
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Bargaining Act, which manifested the state legislature’s legitimate interest in
local affairs by granting thousands of municipal employees the right to bargain
collectively for the first time in Oklahoma history.214
In the national context, the decision in City of Enid reconciled Oklahoma’s
special law jurisprudence with the prevailing, majority view. One national
journal concludes that a population-based classification affecting
municipalities “does not fall within a constitutional inhibition against special
or local laws, or conflict with a provision requiring general laws to have
uniform operation, where the classification reasonably is related to the
purposes and objects of the legislation.”215 Another legal journal reiterates
this view by stating that “[t]he classification of counties, municipal
corporations, and other local governmental bodies may properly be based on
population . . . if such classification is reasonably related and adapted to the
subject or purpose of the statute and is uniform and general in its
application.”216 Thus, by centering its inquiry on the classification contained
within the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act and by
probing whether the Act manifested uniform operation and a rational relation
to the object of the Act, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rendered a decision that
complements the national approach to special law prohibitions.
Regardless of the City of Enid court’s failure to create groundbreaking
precedent, the opinion has demonstrated a positive, subsequent influence on
Oklahoma jurisprudence. Indeed, one recent Oklahoma case accepted the
reasoning of the City of Enid court.217 More importantly, in a six-to-one ruling
released just two months after the City of Enid decision, Justice Kauger
discussed the City of Enid opinion with approval.218 Concurring in Jacobs
Ranch, L.L.C. v. Smith, Justice Kauger emphasized how the City of Enid court
reaffirmed the Burks test as the threshold analysis into “what constituted a
class for the purposes of determining whether a legislative enactment was a
special law barred by the Oklahoma Constitution, art[icle] 5, § 46.”219 The
most striking part of Justice Kauger’s concurrence illustrated, in detail, the
ramifications that would have followed a finding in City of Enid that the Act
214. See 11 OKLA. STAT. § 51-201 (Supp. 2006).
215. 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations, Etc. § 93 (2000).
216. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 185 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
217. Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 2006 OK 98, ¶ 18 n.42, 152 P.3d 861, 869 n.42 (striking a
statute that required an affidavit of merit in a medical malpractice action as an unconstitutional
special law).
218. Jacobs Ranch, L.L.C. v. Smith, 2006 OK 34, ¶ 2, 148 P.3d 842, 858-59 (Kauger, J.,
concurring) (upholding the constitutionality of amendments to water use laws that placed a
moratorium on the issuance of temporary permits for out-of-basin municipal or public use of
water in sensitive sole-source groundwater basins or subbasins).
219. Id.
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constituted an impermissible special law.220 According to Justice Kauger, such
a finding “would have effectively nullified at least 51 population-based
legislative enactments that regulate the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards
and school districts, some of which have been on the books since just after
statehood.”221 Moreover, such a ruling “would have voided at least an
additional 19 statutes in which the legislature has made a distinction based on
population for the purpose of facilitating state services through counties or
cities.”222 Measured against this striking backdrop, one could argue that what
the City of Enid decision lacked in precedential value was overwhelmingly
remedied by the beneficial impact of the decision on the lives of millions of
Oklahomans.
VI. Conclusion
Believing “that those with political power would carve out for themselves
special exceptions to our general laws,”223 the framers of the Oklahoma
Constitution specifically incorporated provisions to safeguard state citizens
from the discriminatory effects of special and local legislation.224 Article 5,
section 46 of the constitution provides an unequivocal prohibition against
special laws in specified fields, while article 5, section 59 allows for special
laws in areas left unmentioned by section 46 when a general law cannot be
fashioned. The original understanding of these provisions guided the
deferential development of Oklahoma special and local law jurisprudence for
the century preceding the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in City of
Enid v. Public Employees Relations Board. In City of Enid, the court upheld
an act granting the right to collectively bargain to municipal employees in
cities with a population of at least thirty-five thousand on the grounds that the
Act represented a rational, reasonable enactment that exhibited uniform
application to all members of the class. Although the City of Enid opinion
lacked the scope and clarity inherent to a seminal decision, the ruling
recognized original understanding, refocused the constitutional inquiry
regarding special law prohibitions on the classification contained within
challenged legislation, and employed the appropriate test to find that the Act
represented a general law. More importantly, the decision made manifest the
220. Id. ¶ 2 n.1, 148 P.3d at 858 n.1.
221. Id.
222. Id. To truly appreciate the breadth of how the City of Enid decision could have
impacted the lives of Oklahomans, this note commends the reading of Justice Kauger’s footnote
to any reader interested in understanding how one judicial opinion can affect Oklahomans of
every walk of life.
223. Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 20, 760 P.2d 816, 824.
224. See OKLA. CONST. art. 5, §§ 46, 59.
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promises of a constitution once considered to be “the most radical organic law
ever adopted in the Union”225 by safeguarding the right of thousands of
Oklahoma municipal employees to collectively bargain for the first time in
Oklahoma’s century-long history.
Kristopher Dale Jarvis

225. Oklahoma’s Radical Constitution, 87 OUTLOOK 229, 229 (1907).
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